Unjust Timing Limitations in Genetic Malpractice by Clayton, Ellen W. et al.
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law 
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 
1-2020 
Unjust Timing Limitations in Genetic Malpractice 
Ellen W. Clayton 
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Gary Marchant 
Arizona State University 
Bonnie LeRoy 
University of Minnesota 
Lauren Clatch 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications 
 Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ellen W. Clayton, Gary Marchant, Bonnie LeRoy, and Lauren Clatch, Unjust Timing Limitations in Genetic 
Malpractice, 83 Albany Law Review. 61 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1159 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
0061 MARCHANT ET AL, UNJUST GENETIC MALPRACTICE TIMING LIMITATIONS 1/17/2020 2:55 PM 
 
61 
UNJUST TIMING LIMITATIONS IN GENETIC MALPRACTICE 
CASES† 
Gary Marchant* 
Bonnie LeRoy** 
Lauren Clatch*** 
Ellen Wright Clayton**** 
As genomic data are increasingly being collected and applied in 
clinical care, physicians, laboratories, and other health care 
providers are more frequently being sued for alleged medical 
malpractice or negligence.1  Because the genetic underpinnings of an 
existing or future health condition may not be immediately apparent, 
such cases sometimes raise unique timing issues involving the 
applicable statute of limitations, statute of repose, or statutory 
notification requirements.2  Although these timing limitations on 
when a lawsuit can be brought have important policy rationales and 
justifications, such as helping to protect providers from open-ended 
liability,3 their application to genetic liability cases may sometimes 
result in fundamental unfairness and unjust results because of the 
unavoidable delayed discovery of the potential negligence in 
detecting or addressing the genetic contribution of a patient’s 
condition.4 
 
† Preparation of this Article was funded by National Human Genome Research Institute 
(NHGRI) and National Cancer Institute (NCI) grant #1R01HG008605 (Wolf, Clayton, Lawrenz, 
PIs), as part of a project on “LawSeqSM: Building a Sound Legal Foundation for Translating 
Genomics into Clinical Application.”  The views expressed in this Article are those of the 
authors and not necessarily those of the funders. 
* Gary Marchant, J.D., M.P.P., Ph.D., is Regents’ Professor of Law and Faculty Director of 
the Center for Law, Science and Innovation at Arizona State University. 
** Bonnie LeRoy, M.S., L.G.C., is Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in Genetic 
Counseling at the University of Minnesota. 
*** Lauren Clatch is a candidate for a joint degree in law (J.D.) and social psychology (Ph.D.) 
at the University of Minnesota. 
**** Ellen W. Clayton, M.D., J.D., is Craig-Weaver Chair in Pediatrics, and Professor of Law 
at Vanderbilt University Medical Center and Vanderbilt University. 
1 Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, Genomic Malpractice: An Emerging Tide or Gentle 
Ripple?, 73 FOOD DRUG L.J. 1, 2 (2018). 
2 Id. at 26. 
3 See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
4 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26; infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
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The timing dilemmas presented in genetic malpractice cases are 
illustrated by a closely-watched pending case in South Carolina––
Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.5  In that case, a test laboratory 
failed to recognize the clinical significance of a mutation carried by a 
child, classifying it as a variant of unknown significance.6  As a result, 
the child was not given the appropriate treatment and tragically 
passed away.7  The substantive issue in the case is when the 
laboratory should have recognized the pathogenic nature of the 
mutation and communicated that information to the child’s treating 
physician.8  However, the case may be decided on a procedural timing 
issue, depending in part on whether the lawsuit against the 
laboratory is considered a medical malpractice case or a general 
negligence case.9  The South Carolina District Court certified a 
question to the South Carolina Supreme Court to determine whether 
“a federally licensed genetic testing laboratory” is considered a 
“licensed health care provider” under South Carolina law, and the 
South Carolina Supreme Court answered affirmatively, meaning 
that the six-year statute of repose for medical malpractice may 
apply.10 
The defendants have now moved to dismiss the case since the case 
was brought more than eight years after the laboratory’s allegedly 
negligent act.11  However, the plaintiff’s mother did not discover, and 
had no reasonable means to discover, until long after the statute of 
repose had run that the laboratory allegedly should have known of 
the pathogenic nature of the child’s mutation at the time of testing.12  
Although this case is still pending as of the time of this writing, if the 
court were to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim as untimely, such an 
outcome would be an example of a manifestly unjust result in a 
genetic malpractice case in which a family had no possible way to 
determine the nature of the genetic condition and the alleged 
malpractice until well after the time for filing a lawsuit had expired. 
 
5 Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 432, 440, 443 (D. S.C. 2018); see Turna 
Ray, Mother’s Negligence Suit Against Quest’s Athena Could Broadly Impact Genetic Testing 
Labs, GENOMEWEB (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics
/mothers-negligence-suit-against-quests-athena-could-broadly-impact-genetic [https://perma
.cc/3TVH-Y539]. 
6 Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 436–37. 
7 Id. at 437. 
8 See id. at 437, 441, 443, 445. 
9 See id. at 438, 440, 443. 
10 Id. at 436, 440; Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 816 S.E.2d 564, 564, 566 (S.C. 2018). 
11 Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 436, 443. 
12 Id. at 444–45. 
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While similar problems occasionally pop up in other types of 
medical malpractice cases,13 they are likely to be much more common 
in genetic malpractice cases because the provider error often remains 
hidden for years or even decades.14  This then creates a growing 
tension between the injured plaintiff’s right to seek legal recourse in 
a case, where they have allegedly been injured, against the providers’ 
interest in preventing open-ended liability and the litigation of old 
cases where the evidence may be stale.  This Article addresses this 
tension and the potential unfairness that may result in genetic 
malpractice cases due to statutory timing constraints.  In Part I, we 
provide background on the types, purposes, requirements, and 
prevalence of such timing limitations.  In Part II, we provide some 
additional examples of unfair and unjust outcomes in genetic 
malpractice cases from applying such timing limits.  Finally, in 
Part III, we offer some potential solutions that recognizes the 
legitimate need of health care providers to not face open-ended 
liability while also protecting injured patients from being blocked 
from seeking a legal remedy when they could not have possibly 
discovered their potential legal claim before the applicable timing 
limitation had expired.  This problem raises the broader issue of what 
should lawmakers do when a legal regime that was created for an 
earlier era and different technology is now challenged by new 
technology that may not fit or align well with that historical legal 
regime. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON LITIGATING TIMING LIMITATIONS 
In torts and other types of litigation, certain state statutes limit 
the time within which a plaintiff can bring a claim, which are 
generically called statutory limitations (SLs).15  These statutory 
limitations can be in two main categories: statutes of limitation 
(SoLs) and statutes of repose (SoRs).16  As elaborated below, SoLs 
generally run from the time that the plaintiff did or should have 
discovered that they had a cause of action, whereas SoRs are more 
harsh, and run from the time that the tortious act occurred, 
regardless of whether or when the plaintiff discovered the tortious 
nature of the act.17  A third type of timing limitation in tort lawsuits 
 
13 See, e.g., Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 407, 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1982). 
14 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 10, 26. 
15 See Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 819–20 (Okla. 1988). 
16 Id. 
17 See id.  For further elaboration on the SoL and SoR, see infra notes 27–37 and 
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are statutes that require a plaintiff to provide timely notification of 
their intent to sue, which often apply only to defendants that are 
public institutions.18 
These SLs impose bright-line rules to bar claims brought after the 
times specified.19  Courts emphasize that the purpose of such SLs 
involves justice and process concerns, including that evidence 
deteriorates over time, defendants are entitled to peace of mind at 
some point, insurers and defendants need a degree of certainty in 
order to estimate future costs, and societal expectations and 
standards change over time.20  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated back in 1944 that statutory limitation periods are 
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through 
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses 
have disappeared.  The theory is that even if one has a just 
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend 
within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of 
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to 
prosecute them.21 
In the genetic context, these practical arguments for timing 
limitations will have particular salience.  There is a strong argument 
that providers need to be protected from open-ended liability, as gene 
sequencing and testing will generate many “variants of unknown 
significance” at the time of the testing, but which may have clinical 
significance later on.22  Given the well-known hindsight bias of jurors 
and the liability system,23 there will be a tendency and temptation to 
 
accompanying text. 
18 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-401 
(LexisNexis 2019). 
19 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 241, at 871 (2d ed. 2011). 
20 Id. § 241, at 872; see also Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 
283, 287 (Tex. 2010) (“One practical upside of curbing open-ended exposure is to prevent 
defendants from answering claims where evidence may prove elusive due to unavailable 
witnesses (perhaps deceased), faded memories, lost or destroyed records, and institutions that 
no longer exist.”). 
21 Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). 
22 See Adrian Thorogood et al., Public Variant Databases: Liability?, 19 GENETICS MED. 838, 
839 (2017). 
23 See e.g., Hal R. Arkes, The Consequences of the Hindsight Bias in Medical Decision 
Making, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 356, 356 (2013); Matt Groeb, Does Bifurcation 
Eliminate the Problem: A Closer Look at Hindsight Bias in the Courtroom, 23 JURY EXPERT 17, 
17–18 (2011); Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 9–10; Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias 
and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1281–82 (1999). 
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second-guess the provider’s initial judgment and attribute greater 
knowledge than is fair retrospectively the longer the window of 
liability remains open.24 
On the other hand, as discussed further below, the unique timing 
issues and nature of genetic malpractice cases may result in some 
plaintiffs not discovering the negligence that harmed them until after 
the timing statute has expired.25  Thus, although the purpose and 
meaning of SLs may seem simple on first impression, their 
application raises many complex and difficult issues in balancing the 
interests of the parties.  Judge Richard Posner cautioned, “Though 
rarely the subject of sustained scholarly attention, the law concerning 
statutes of limitations fairly bristles with subtle, intricate, often 
misunderstood issues.”26 
Typically, in negligence claims,27 the statutory clock does not start 
until the defendant commits a negligent act and that act caused 
legally cognizable harm.28  Many states have added a third triggering 
requirement, which is when the plaintiff reasonably should have 
discovered the negligent act.29  This two- or three-prong requirement 
is typical for statutes of limitation.30  Statutes of repose, on the other 
hand, provide an alternative to the two- or three-prong requirement 
of statutes of limitations and require only that a negligent act 
occurred to trigger the statutory clock.31  Although almost all legal 
actions have an SoL (extreme criminal charges such as murder being 
an exception), SoRs are imposed by state legislatures much more 
selectively.32  In addition, unlike an SoL, an SoR generally cannot be 
 
24 See Arkes, supra note 23, at 358. 
25 See infra notes 160–169 and accompanying text. 
26 Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1996). 
27 Negligence claims are a subset of tort claims where a defendant allegedly fails to exercise 
reasonable care.  See B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States, 
467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS RELATED RES. 339, 340 (Nov. 26, 2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2628513/pdf/11999_2008_Article_636.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAT9-
AU63].  Most medical malpractice lawsuits involve a negligence claim.  See, e.g., id. at 342. 
28 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 242, at 876.  These two requirements do not apply to all 
torts.  Id. 
29 Id. § 243, at 878 & n.6. 
30 Id. § 243, at 878–79. 
31 Id. § 244, at 884.  The act of diagnosing and communicating the diagnosis to the patient 
is considered the legally cognizable “act,” not the means of coming to the diagnosis by viewing 
records or lab tests, which might occur on a different day than the communication with the 
patient.  See, e.g., Green v. Nat’l Health Lab., 870 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Ark. 1994). 
32 See Cara O’Neill, Civil Statutes of Limitations, NOLO (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nolo.com
/legal-encyclopedia/statute-of-limitations-state-laws-chart-29941.html [https://perma.cc
/VG3A-PH82]; Criminal Statutes of Limitations: Time Limits for State Charges, LAWINFO, 
https://resources.lawinfo.com/criminal-defense/criminal-statute-limitations-time-limits.html 
[https://perma.cc/B2LN-7PU6]; see, e.g., New York Legislature Considers Enacting Statute of 
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tolled.33  A Tennessee court succinctly explained the difference 
between an SoL and SoR as follows: 
A statute of limitations governs the time within which suit 
may be brought once a cause of action accrued.  A statute of 
repose limits the time within which an action may be brought, 
“but it is entirely unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action 
and can, in fact, bar a cause of action before it has accrued.”34 
In order to understand the differential purposes of SoLs and SoRs, 
it is helpful to consider the history of SoRs, the more recent of the two 
SLs.  SoRs were mostly enacted as part of the tort reform legislation 
in the 1970s and 80s and were created to protect certain groups such 
as product manufacturers, government entities, architects and 
builders, and health care professionals from long liability “tails” that 
were seen as excessive.35  The SoRs were intended “to eliminate 
uncertainties under the related statute of limitations and to create a 
final deadline for filing suit that is not subject to any exceptions.”36  
SoRs pertaining to health care providers’ typically begin to run at the 
moment of “the doctor’s last act or the completion of treatment,” even 
if the harm from that last act does not become evident until later.37 
Because health care providers are subject to primarily negligence 
and medical malpractice claims, SLs in negligence and medical 
malpractice statutes are relevant here.  Medical malpractice claims 
are a subset of negligence claims, but courts do not have standardized 
rules across jurisdictions for determining whether a case with a 
 
Repose Legislation, GOLDBERG SEGALA (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.goldbergsegalla.com/news-
and-knowledge/news/new-york-legislature-considers-enacting-statute-of-repose-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/ZK4T-BKDL]. 
33 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014) (quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 
U.S. 1, 10 (2014)). 
34 Jones v. Methodist Healthcare, 83 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Cronin 
v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995)) (citing Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson 
Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 421 (Del. 1985)). 
35 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at 885; see, e.g., Branch v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 
636 So. 2d 211, 212–217 (La. 1994) (discussing a medical malpractice tort reform statute).  To 
date, the greatest number of SoRs involve construction and products liability.  See Aaron 
Larson, What Is a Statute of Repose, EXPERTLAW (May 8, 2018), https://www.expertlaw.com
/library/civil-litigation/what-statue-of-repose [https://perma.cc/K7PT-EWA6].  The groups 
protected by SORs starting in the 1970s and 80s lobbied for the statutes that instituted shorter 
statutory clocks vis-à-vis 1-prong “act” triggers.  See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at 
885. 
36 Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Tex. 2010). 
37 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at 885; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482(a) (2019); FLA. 
STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5838a(2) (2019); MO. REV STAT. § 516.105 
(2018). 
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health care professional defendant is one of typical negligence or 
medical malpractice;38 and this impacts SL determinations because 
negligence and medical malpractice SLs can be different within the 
same jurisdiction.39  For example, Minnesota has a medical 
malpractice SoL of four years40 and a negligence SoL of six years.41  
Additionally, SoRs apply much more selectively, and in many states 
will apply to a medical malpractice action but not a general 
negligence claim.42 
If the SL is written to require an alleged wrongful act and some 
knowledge of the defendant’s alleged contribution to the harm (in 
other words, written as an SoL), then the court has to determine 
based on statutory language and case law precedent if the triggering 
event is the manifestation of an injury or the discovery of the 
defendant’s role in causing the injury.43  If, on the other hand, the 
statute is written to require only an alleged act, as is the case of an 
SoR, this distinction is moot.  Specifically, SoRs are upheld even 
when the injury becomes perceptible after the SoR time has run,44 
whereas SoL decisions often revolve around determination of when 
the injury occurred45 and/or when the plaintiff knew or with 
reasonable diligence should have known of the injury, its cause, and 
the defendant’s possible error.46  Figure 1 provides a conceptual 
timeline depicting a hypothetical medical practitioner’s act, a 
cognizable injury, and patient’s discovery with arrows indicating 
what is conceptually categorized as an SoR or SoL.  As will be seen in 
later case examples, the SoR often does not extend to the patient’s 
discovery of the tort, especially in cases like genomic malpractice, 
where the tort and injury may not be immediately apparent.47 
 
38 See, e.g., Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 432, 440, 441–42 (D. S.C. 
2018) (citing Dawkins v. Union Hosp. Dist., 758 S.E.2d 501, 504–05 (S.C. 2014)); Scott v. 
Uljanov, 541 N.E.2d 398, 398–99 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting Bleiler v. Bodnar, 479 N.E.2d 230, 234 
(N.Y. 1985)). 
39 See Scott, 541 N.E.2d at 399. 
40 MINN. STAT. § 541.076(b) (2019). 
41 Id. § 541.05 subdiv. 1(5). 
42 See, e.g., Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. D. M., 779 S.E.2d 36, 39 (Ga. Ct. App.2015). 
43 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at 878-84. 
44 See, e.g., Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948, 950–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that an eighteen-year statute of repose of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 bars 
products liability claims by survivors of passengers killed in airplane crash). 
45 See, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 553, 555 (2000). 
46 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 250 (2019). 
47 See infra Part II. 
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The following sections describe cases involving defendant health 
care professionals and plaintiffs who suffered a harm but whose 
genetic malpractice claims were barred by various SLs, explaining 
how genetic conditions pose a particularly acute problem to 
traditional medical malpractice SLs. 
II.  EXAMPLES OF UNJUST OUTCOMES IN GENOMIC MALPRACTICE 
CASES 
Genetic conditions will often present SoL and SoR issues because 
the discovery of the genetic risk may not occur until several years 
after a physician commits the allegedly negligent act, by which time 
the traditional SoL, SoR, or statutory notification requirement may 
have run.  A recent analysis of over 200 genetic malpractice cases 
found that “the mean time between filing of a case and the final 
decision was 6.75 years,”48 whereas other medical malpractice cases 
take a mean of just over 3.5 years from conduct to resolution.49  Thus, 
genetic malpractice cases take, on average, almost twice as long to 
resolve as other medical malpractice cases.  Presumably, the actual 
litigation of a genetic malpractice case does not take significantly 
longer than any other malpractice case, it is just that genetic 
malpractice cases are discovered and filed later after the time of 
medical error than in other medical malpractice cases.50  This is 
because the negligent act regarding a genetic test is often not 
immediately manifest but may remain latent for years or even 
 
48 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 15. 
49 See Seth A. Seabury et al., On Average, Physicians Spend Nearly 11 Percent of Their 40-
Year Careers with an Open, Unresolved Malpractice Claim, 32 HEALTH AFF. 111, 113 (2013). 
50 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model of SoR and SoL 
0061 MARCHANT ET AL, UNJUST GENETIC MALPRACTICE TIMING LIMITATIONS 1/17/2020  2:55 PM 
2019/2020] Unjust Genetic Malpractice Timing Limitations 69 
decades before being discovered.51  Thus, the traditional application 
of litigation timing requirements in a medical malpractice case 
involving genetics could result in manifestly unjust results. 
SoRs result in particularly harsh results.52  For example, consider 
a case decided by the Florida Supreme Court.53  In this case, a family 
had their first child who was affected by multiple disabilities, and the 
parents then were tested for genetic abnormalities that might affect 
future children.54  Even though the child did have a genetic 
abnormality (trisomy of part of chromosome 10), as revealed by 
chromosomal testing, that result was never communicated to the 
family.55  The failure of the physician to communicate the genetic 
testing results to the family was the allegedly negligent act.56  
However, the harm caused by that negligent act did not arise until 
five years later when the couple had a second child with the same 
genetic condition, and the physician’s error in failing to communicate 
the genetic results five years earlier was discovered.57  It is important 
to note that, although the negligent act occurred five years later, the 
tort was not completed, and no lawsuit could have been filed, until 
the second child was born, as the harm caused by the negligence was 
the birth of the second affected child (damages are an essential 
precondition for filing a tort claim).58  Although the parents filed their 
lawsuit two years after their second child was born, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that the lawsuit was barred by Florida’s four-
year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions.59  In other 
words, the statute of repose had run before the tort was even 
complete.60  The parents’ right to sue had expired before a lawsuit 
could possibly have been filed, which is arguably a manifestly unjust 
outcome. 
Another statute of repose case involved alleged negligence in 
failing to diagnose Long QT syndrome, a genetic condition that 
increases the risk of sudden death.61  The physician defendant 
 
51 See id. at 26–27. 
52 See Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 421–22 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (citing Melendez v. 
Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So. 2d 735, 735–36 (Fla. 1987)). 
53 Kush, 616 So. 2d 415. 
54 See id. at 417. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. 
58 See 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 479, at 2. 
59 See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417, 421–22, 424 (citing Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 515 
So. 2d 735, 735–36 (Fla. 1987)). 
60 See id. at 421. 
61 Burton v. Macha, 846 N.W.2d 419, 420–21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). 
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admitted Connor Burton into the hospital on June 21, 2005, for a 
tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy.62  An EKG readout at the hospital 
reported “prolonged QT”, and although the defendant reviewed and 
initialed the EKG report, he took no other action on this 
information.63  Almost four years later, on April 17, 2009, Connor 
passed away suddenly, and his autopsy failed to detect any signs of 
injury or illness.64  A few months later, on September 11, 2009, 
genetic testing revealed a mutation “strongly associated with an 
arrhythmia-causing syndrome, such as Type 3 Long QT Syndrome.”65  
A month later, on October 13, 2009, Connor’s death certificate was 
amended to reflect “[s]udden cardiac death due to or as a consequence 
of Prolonged QT Syndrome due to or as a consequence of Mutation 
SCN5A Thr 370 Type 3 Met (of years duration).”66  Connor’s family 
brought a medical malpractice lawsuit on October 13, 2011, alleging 
that the defendants were negligent in “failing to diagnose Connor 
with prolonged QT syndrome and failing to refer him for appropriate 
treatment.”67  The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that although 
the three-year statute of limitations did not start to run until the 
death certificate was amended based on the genetic testing in the fall 
of 2009, the six-year statute of repose started to run on the date of 
the negligent act (June 21, 2005), and therefore the lawsuit was 
precluded by the statute of repose.68 
This case has a harsh outcome, although it is not as egregious as 
the previous one because the harm (Connor’s sudden death) occurred 
before the statute of repose had completely run.69  Yet, by the time 
the death certificate was revised, giving the family the first clue that 
a potentially negligent act had contributed to Connor’s death, the 
family was left with only about twenty months to discover the 
negligence and file a lawsuit before the statute of repose had run.70  
Additionally, even though the lawsuit was filed well within the three-
year statute of limitations, a claim just needs to exceed one of the 
applicable SLs to be dismissed.71 
 
62 See id. at 420. 
63 See id. at 420–21. 
64 See id. at 420. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 420–21. 
67 Id. at 421. 
68 See id. at 420–23. 
69 See id. at 420–21, 423. 
70 See id. at 420–23. 
71 See id. at 421–22. 
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In another genetic SoR case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in 
2017 upheld a trial court’s finding for the defendant medical 
practitioner, awarding judgment based on an expired SoR.72  In this 
case, a son donated a lobe of his liver to his mother, who was 
diagnosed with a genetic disorder, Alpha-1 Antitrypsin Deficiency 
(AATD), after testing in the same year as the donation purportedly 
demonstrated that the son did not have AATD.73  Eleven years later, 
in 2014, when his mother was experiencing more liver issues, the 
family discovered the son’s positive AATD test result from 2003.74  A 
lawsuit was filed in 2015.75  The SoR at issue in this case detailed a 
general rule for the SoR and an exception: 
§ 1303.513.  Statute of repose 
(a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c), 
no cause of action asserting a medical professional liability 
claim may be commenced after seven years from the date of 
the alleged tort or breach of contract. 
(b) Injuries caused by foreign object.--If the injury is or was 
caused by a foreign object unintentionally left in the 
individual’s body, the limitation in subsection (a) shall not 
apply.76 
However, the state supreme court’s previous precedent explained 
that “the injury need not have occurred, much less have been 
discovered.”77  Thus, because judicial gloss did not leave room to 
argue that “alleged tort” must include a cognizable, known injury, 
patients argued that (1) the SoR violated equal protection and due 
process in the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, and (2) the SoR 
violated the open courts provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution.78  
The state appellate court disagreed with the arguments, reasoning 
that (1) there is no fundamental human interest at stake in obtaining 
damages in civil claims and the foreign object exception is different 
 
72 See Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 1331 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 3168991, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 
26, 2017) (citing Swift v. Milner, 538 A.2d 28, 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Booher v. Olczak, 797 
A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)), cert. granted in part, denied in part, 183 A.3d 346 (Pa. 
2018) (per curiam), and rev’d, No. 10 WAP 2018, 2019 WL 5608534 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019). 
73 See Yanakos, 2017 WL 3168991, at *1. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. at *2. 
76 Id. at *3; accord 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.513 (2019), invalidated by Yanakos v. UPMC 
No. 10 WAP 2018, 2019 WL 5608534 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019). 
77 Yanakos, 2017 WL 3168991, at *3 (quoting Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 
211 (Pa. 2009)). 
78 Yanakos, 2017 WL 3168991, at *2. 
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from the instant case because durability of evidence is not as strong 
as having evidence of wrongdoing nestled in one’s body and (2) state 
Supreme Court precedent rejects the open courts argument to SoRs.79 
On March 28, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in this case to hear the specific question: “Does the [Medical 
Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act] MCARE Statute of 
Repose violate the Open Courts guarantees of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, Article I, § 11, where it arbitrarily and capriciously 
deprives some patients of any access to courts, but permits actions by 
similarly situated patients?”80  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
answered this question affirmatively on October 31, 2019, and struck 
down the MCARE statute of repose,81 an outcome that will likely have 
an important impact on the role of SoRs in denying plaintiffs a viable 
litigation option in similar SoR cases. 
SoLs can also produce harsh results in genetic malpractice cases, 
especially in states with very short statutes of limitation for medical 
malpractice actions.82  An example is provided by a case in which a 
pregnant mother knew she was a carrier for the sickle cell trait and 
had the father of her fetus genetically tested in order to prevent 
conceiving a child with sickle cell disease.83  On January 16, 1985, 
the hospital misread the test results and incorrectly reported that 
father was not a carrier, and the mother gave birth to a child on 
August 30, 1985.84  The child was diagnosed with sickle cell disease, 
and the mother brought suit against the hospital.85  She was first 
required to provide notice to the hospital, which she did on November 
27, 1985, and then filed a lawsuit on September 11, 1986.86  A lower 
court held that the statute of limitations was tolled by the 
“continuous treatment doctrine,” under which the statute of 
limitations does not start to run until the end of the patient’s 
treatment, which the lower court determined to be the date of the 
child’s birth.87  The lawsuit was brought within eighteen months of 
 
79 See id. at *5–7 (first quoting Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001); 
and then quoting Krason v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 1985)) (citing 
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa. 1978)). 
80 Yanakos v. UPMC, 183 A.3d 346, 346–47 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam). 
81 Yanakos, 2019 WL 5608534, at *1. 
82 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26–29. 
83 Jorge v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 590 N.E.2d 239, 239 (N.Y. 1992). 
84 Id. at 239–40. 
85 Id. at 240. 
86 Jorge v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 563 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (App. Div. 1991), rev’d, 590 
N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 1992). 
87 See Jorge, 590 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 577 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 
(N.Y. 1991)); Jorge, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 413. 
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the child’s birth, when the mother first had the opportunity to 
discover the hospital’s negligence, and therefore the lower court held 
that the suit was brought within the applicable SoL.88  The New York 
Court of Appeals, in contrast, held that the statute of limitations 
started to run on the date that the father’s erroneous genetic results 
were reported since that genetic test “was simply not committed in 
relation to the ongoing obstetric care that plaintiff received.”89  Thus, 
the eighteen-month statute of limitations ran throughout the 
remainder of the pregnancy, during which the mother had no way of 
knowing the hospital had made its mistake.  Consequently, by the 
time the negligence was discovered and the lawsuit was filed, the 
eighteen-month statute of limitations had run, and the lawsuit was 
dismissed as time-barred.90 
Another type of timing limitation is a requirement to provide 
advance notice of a pending lawsuit against a public entity, such as a 
city or a public university hospital.91  This type of timing 
requirement, which is typically very short, can also produce unjust 
results in a genetic malpractice case.92  In one such example involving 
a statutory notice requirement, a five-year-old girl died while being 
treated by a doctor employed by a public university clinic, and an 
autopsy and further research indicated that the patient had an 
undisclosed genetic heart condition.93  Once the genetic risk factor 
was discovered after the girl’s death, the mother promptly brought a 
lawsuit alleging the doctor was negligent in not diagnosing the girl’s 
genetic heart ailment.94  The case was dismissed because the plaintiff 
failed to comply with the notice requirement for a public entity, which 
requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff provide notice of the 
claim within ninety days of the negligent act.95  In this case, the 
mother had no way to discover the negligent act until over ninety 
days after the negligent act occurred, but the court dismissed the 
claim nonetheless, even while acknowledging that the genetic nature 
of disease was not known during the ninety day notice period.96 
 
88 See Jorge, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 412–14. 
89 Jorge, 590 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Nykorchuck, 577 N.E.2d at 1027). 
90 Jorge, 590 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Nykorchuck, 577 N.E.2d at 1027). 
91 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 29. 
92 See id. 
93 See Hood v. Ramagopal, No. A-1480-13T4, 2015 WL 5008979, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. Aug. 18, 2015). 
94 See id. 
95 See id. at *4, *6. 
96 See id. at *2, *6. 
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III.  SOLUTIONS 
The specific examples presented in the previous section portend a 
much greater forward-looking problem for the medical malpractice 
system.  As genetics becomes an increasingly important part of 
clinical medicine,97 and consequently as more cases of genomic 
malpractice are brought to the courts,98 the problem of unjust 
application of SLs in such cases will surely proliferate.  This is due to 
both the increased frequency of such cases,99 and the inherent nature 
of genetic malpractice cases where a provider’s error may remain 
“silent” and undetectable for years or even decades.100  These genomic 
malpractice cases typically involve the failure to accurately obtain 
and apply information about future health risks, and so the harm and 
indication of error usually does not become apparent until those 
future genetic-related risks manifest.101  By that time, under current 
legal doctrine, the SoL or SoR may well have expired. 
How can legal systems respond when legal doctrine established to 
control technology in one era now become obsolete or result in unjust 
outcomes when applied to new technologies not anticipated when the 
original doctrine was established?  One option would be to just accept 
some unjust applications––the world is not perfect, and if the legal 
doctrine is serving a useful purpose in most contexts (which is the 
case with SLs), then maybe some unjust applications are 
inevitable.102  This strategy of complacency and non-action is 
becoming increasingly untenable in the era of clinical genomics, when 
more and more unjust results like the ones described in the previous 
section are expected occur. 
A second strategy would be to throw out the old rules altogether 
and go without rules in that subject area.103  SLs do serve important 
functions in protecting providers and the court system from stale 
cases and open-ended liability,104 so eliminating SLs altogether is 
also an untenable solution.  A third strategy would be to adopt sui 
generis SL rules just for genomic malpractice cases.105  But 
 
97 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
98 See id. at 16. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. at 15, 18–19, 26. 
102 See Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 283, 292 (Tex. 2010) 
(citing S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 23 (Tex. 1996)). 
103 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 875. 
104 See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text. 
105 Lyria Bennet Moses, Sui Generis Rules, in 7 THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 77–78, 81 (Gary E. 
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technology-specific sui generis rules have many problems, including 
definitional issues, unfairness, and over-inclusivity and under-
inclusivity.106  Moreover, since SLs are adopted on a state-by-state 
basis by state legislatures,107 it would be impractical to expect new 
laws to be adopted specifically for genetic malpractice cases in every 
state any time in the foreseeable future. 
Since doing nothing, eliminating the existing SL rules, or adopting 
sui generis SLs for genomic malpractice are all untenable or 
infeasible, the remaining option would be to try to modify the 
application of SLs to avoid the harsh and unjust impacts in genomic 
malpractice cases.108  There is a long history of courts, and to a lesser 
extent legislatures, modifying the application of SLs in other contexts 
where they were producing unfair or unjust outcomes.109  
Historically, courts have interpreted state timing statutes to instill a 
degree of flexibility by making findings of law that control (1) the 
starting time for the statutory clock, (2) time-outs (or “tolling”), and 
(3) selecting which statute applies to the case.110  For example, courts 
in most states adopted a “discovery rule” under which the applicable 
statute of limitations would only start running once the plaintiff did 
or should have discovered the tortious act, rather than the traditional 
rule, which started the statute of limitations when the tortious act 
occurred.111  Some precedents of judicial flexibility and creativity in 
applying statutory timing limitations and the lessons they may 
provide for genetic malpractice cases are provided in Section III.A.  
To address the unfair and unjust application of timing provisions in 
genetic malpractice suits, several other policy fixes are possible, 
which are addressed in Section III.B, below.  
A. Past Precedents for Adjusting Litigation Timing Provisions to 
Avoid Injustice 
Timing limitations such as SoL and SoR have resulted in 
unreasonable or unjust outcomes in other litigation contexts,112 and 
 
Marchant et al. eds., 2011). 
106 Id. at 83–84, 86, 88. 
107 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 872. 
108 See id. § 241, at 875; Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26–27. 
109 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 875–76; Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 
26–27. 
110 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 875. 
111 2 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION, § 25.83, 
at 370–71 (rev. ed. 1994). 
112 See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 540–44 (1974); Burnett v. N.Y. 
Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 424–25 (1965). 
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in some cases, courts or legislatures have intervened to prevent such 
unfair results.113  In one such example, a litigant brought a lawsuit 
in state court, but the court dismissed the case for improper venue.114  
The plaintiff then properly filed the same lawsuit in the federal court, 
but the district court and appellate court held that the action was 
now time barred because the SoL had expired.115  The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that although the SoL had technically run, the 
policy behind timing limitations is outweighed “where the interests 
of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s right.”116 
Another context that required judicial flexibility was when a 
harmed party was within a putative class in a prospective class 
action, but then the class was not certified for one reason or 
another.117  By the time a court decides not to certify the class, it may 
be too late under the SoL for prospective class members to file 
individual lawsuits.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that in at least 
some such circumstances the SoL for individual lawsuits by putative 
class members is tolled during the pendency of the class certification 
process.118  The Court stated that tolling the SoL in such 
circumstances was within the power of the courts since it was 
consistent with “the policies of ensuring essential fairness to 
defendants and of barring a plaintiff who ‘has slept on his rights.’”119  
Such a judicial modification to the application of the SoL “is in no way 
inconsistent with the functional operation of a statute of 
limitations.”120 
Another judicial innovation to address injustices created by rigid 
application of the statute of limitations is the “two disease” rule.121  
For example, plaintiffs exposed to hazardous substances, such as 
asbestos, face a dilemma due to the typical lag between exposure and 
a diagnosis of mesothelioma.122  The initial symptom of a disease 
process, however, is a condition known as asbestosis, which is usually 
not life threatening, and in many cases followed by a much more 
 
113 See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 555; Burnett, 380 U.S. at 430, 434–35. 
114 Burnett, 380 U.S. at 424–25. 
115 Id. at 425 (first citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 230 F. Supp. 767, 767–68 (S.D. Ohio 
1963); and then citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 332 F.2d 529, 531 (6th Cir. 1964)). 
116 Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428, 434–36. 
117 See Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 542–43. 
118 Id. at 560–61. 
119 Id. at 554 (quoting Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428). 
120 Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 554. 
121 See Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 37 A.3d 1175, 1177 (Pa. 2012). 
122 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: 
Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. 
L. REV. 815, 820 & n.18 (2002). 
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lethal mesothelioma several years or decades later.123  If an exposed 
person suffering from asbestosis brings a lawsuit at the onset of 
initial symptoms, she would be barred by res judicata from bringing 
a second lawsuit years later if and when she developed 
mesothelioma.124  But if she waited to file a lawsuit until she 
developed a more serious condition, such as mesothelioma, the 
defendant would argue that the statute of limitations started to run 
when the plaintiff first experienced asbestosis, and thus were barred 
from bringing a subsequent suit.125  Some states such as Virginia still 
apply that harsh rule.126  But courts in other states used their 
equitable authority to adopt a “two disease” rule, in which each 
disease has its own statute of limitations, even though they result 
from the same tortious act.127 
In more recent years, the courts have used the term “equitable 
tolling” to refer to a court’s inherent authority to toll a statute of 
limitations when justice so requires.128  The Supreme Court has 
generally become more strict over time in applying the equitable 
tolling doctrine, now limiting its application to situations in which 
the litigant establishes two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing 
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”129  In addition, the 
Supreme Court has expressly held that equitable tolling applies only 
to statutes of limitation and not statutes of repose.130 
A similar but distinct doctrine is the “accrual suspension doctrine,” 
which holds that a cause of action does not accrue when the 
“defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff was 
unaware of their existence or it must show that its injury was 
‘inherently unknowable’ at the accrual date.”131  The accrual 
suspension doctrine is “well settled” in case law and “distinct from 
 
123 See id. at 817 n.2, 820 n.18. 
124 Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Henderson & Twerski, supra 
note 122, at 819–20. 
125 See Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. 2000); Henderson & 
Twerski, supra note 122, at 820. 
126 See Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 736 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Va. 2013). 
127 Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 112, 120–21 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
128 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 
408, 418 (2005)); Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500 (1967). 
129 Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2016) (quoting 
Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (2010)). 
130 Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2017) (“[T]he Court 
repeatedly has stated that statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling.”). 
131 Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass’n v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 358–59 (Ct. Cl. 
1967) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949)). 
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the question whether equitable tolling is available.”132  This doctrine 
has traditionally been applied in contractual claims cases against the 
United States Government involving the interpretation of the term 
“accrual” in 28 U.S.C. § 2501,133 but the same equitable doctrine could 
possibly be applied in other contexts, especially when the statute of 
limitations used the term “accrual.” 
The treatment of SLs by courts seems inconsistent––sometimes 
they are applied flexibly and adjusted by equitable factors, while 
other times they are applied rigidly as jurisdictional requirements 
with no flexibility.134  Justice Breyer recently tried to reconcile this 
disparate treatment as follows: 
 Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect 
defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims. . . . Such 
statutes also typically permit courts to toll the limitations 
period in light of special equitable considerations. 
 Some statutes of limitations, however, seek not so much to 
protect a defendant’s case-specific interest in timeliness as to 
achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the 
administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental 
waiver of sovereign immunity, or promoting judicial 
efficiency.  The Court has often read the time limits of these 
statutes as more absolute. . . . As convenient shorthand, the 
Court has sometimes referred to the time limits in such 
statutes as “jurisdictional.”135 
Medical malpractice actions are primarily intended to protect 
health care providers from stale claims and uncertainty,136 rather 
than serving some governmental purpose as in the examples cited by 
Justice Breyer requiring a more absolute approach,137 and thus 
should be open to equitable discretion by courts to prevent unjust 
results. 
 
132 Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012); Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1318–19; Kinsey v. United States, 852 
F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic S.S. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217, 225 
(1964)). 
134 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008). 
135 Id. at 132–34 (internal citations omitted). 
136 See Ruther v. Kaiser, 983 N.E.2d 291, 298 (Ohio 2012); cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 
552 U.S. at 133 (“Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants against stale 
or unduly delayed claims.”). 
137 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 133–34. 
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Another strategy for challenging unreasonable applications of 
statutes of limitations or statutes of repose is to argue that such 
application violates the applicable state constitution,138 which often 
contain provisions assuring a citizen’s right to litigate valid legal 
claims.139  For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held 
that a statute of repose that denied a plaintiff a remedy for an injury 
from a defective machine tool that occurred after the statute of repose 
had run was unconstitutional (the lower court had held that the 
statute of repose had started to run when the defective tool was sold 
by the defendant).140  The court cited approvingly this colorful 
passage from a dissenting opinion in another case: 
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can’t die before you are 
conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a 
crop never planted, or burn down a house never built, or miss 
a train running on a non-existent railroad.  For substantially 
similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a 
sort of logical “axiom,” that a statute of limitations does not 
begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of 
action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to a 
plaintiff.141 
This “logical axiom” arguably applies to all cases in which there 
was no cognizable harm until after the SL expired, but not all states 
have this logical axiom codified in precedent. 
There have, however, been other medical malpractice cases where 
the statute of repose expired before the plaintiffs had any reason to 
know of the negligent act, and the court did not find the statute 
unconstitutional.142  For example, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld 
that state’s four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice cases 
against a constitutional challenge in 2012.143  The defendant 
physician and hospital in that case had allegedly failed to act on 
abnormal liver enzyme tests for a patient who was diagnosed with 
liver lesions and hepatitis C some ten years later.144  The Ohio 
Supreme Court overturned the lower court decision that held the 
 
138 See Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 291–92 (N.H. 1983). 
139 See id. at 294. 
140 Id. at 292, 296. 
141 Id. at 295–96 (quoting Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir.1952) 
(Frank, J., dissenting)). 
142 See, e.g., Ruther v. Kaiser, 983 N.E.2d 291, 300 (Ohio 2012). 
143 See id. at 293. 
144 Id. at 293. 
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statute of repose unconstitutional because it extinguished the 
plaintiff’s legal claim before such a claim was cognizant.145  The 
higher court held that the legislature was within its power to 
establish “a period beyond which medical claims may not be brought 
even if the injury giving rise to the claim does not accrue because it 
is undiscovered until after the period has ended.”146  The state 
supreme court found that the legislature’s decision had a rational 
basis that the courts were required to defer to: 
Forcing medical providers to defend against medical claims 
that occurred 10, 20, or 50 years before presents a host of 
litigation concerns, including the risk that evidence is 
unavailable through the death or unknown whereabouts of 
witnesses, the possibility that pertinent documents were not 
retained, the likelihood that evidence would be untrustworthy 
due to faded memories, the potential that technology may 
have changed to create a different and more stringent 
standard of care not applicable to the earlier time, the risk 
that the medical providers’ financial circumstances may have 
changed—i.e., that practitioners have retired and no longer 
carry liability insurance, the possibility that a practitioner’s 
insurer has become insolvent, and the risk that the 
institutional medical provider may have closed.147 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached a similar decision in a 
case involving a child who was born with a congenital condition that 
later caused blindness, but which was not discovered until after her 
tenth birthday.148  A lawsuit was then filed against the doctor who 
had treated her as a newborn, but the supreme court held that the 
claim was barred by the state’s five-year statute of repose for medical 
malpractice actions.149  Recognizing the “harsh” implications of its 
decision,150 the supreme court nevertheless held that “the legislature 
may sever a person’s claim by a statute of limitations or a statute of 
repose when the person has had no possibility of discovering the 
injury-when the person has been blameless in every respect.  These 
 
145 Id. at 292, 293–94 (citing and quoting Ruther v. Kaiser, No. CA2010-07-066, 2011 WL 
1346836, at *1, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2011)). 
146 Ruther, 983 N.E.2d 291 at 296, 300. 
147 Id. at 296. 
148 See Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 613 N.W.2d 849, 853–55 (Wis. 2000). 
149 Id. at 854–55, 873. 
150 Id. at 873. 
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decisions represent judicial deference to the stated policy of the 
legislature.”151 
Thus, a constitutional challenge to a timing limitation that 
prevents a plaintiff from bringing a valid case before they even had 
reason to know they had a claim will succeed in some but not all 
situations.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held a 
statute of repose unconstitutional in a genomic malpractice case.152  
In situations where a judicial solution is not available on either 
equitable or constitutional grounds, the legislature would be the last 
resort for a remedy to abolish or modify an unfair statutory timing 
limitation that prevents plaintiffs from bringing valid claims.153  For 
example, Illinois originally had a two-year statute of limitations and 
a twelve-year statute of repose for personal injury actions from 
childhood sexual abuse, but in 1994, eliminated the twelve-year 
statute of repose, apparently, in response to a series of discovered 
childhood sexual abuse cases, which would have been time-barred by 
the statute of repose notwithstanding the due diligence of the 
plaintiffs.154  Another example is that in some states, such as 
Mississippi and Massachusetts, the state legislature, rather than the 
courts, enacted a discovery rule for starting the clock on the statute 
of limitations when the plaintiff discovers the tort, rather than when 
the tort occurs, in at least some tort cases.155 
Perhaps the most pertinent example is the recent legislative 
activity in the State of New York to pass “Lavern’s Law,” a bill that 
redefines the state’s statute of limitations for medical malpractice 
claims by cancer patients by extending the initiation time from when 
the medical mistake is made (often involving a physician failing to 
make an earlier cancer diagnosis) forward in time to when the cancer 
is discovered.156  The bill was named after a cancer patient named 
Lavern Wilkinson who died from cancer and was denied the right to 
pursue a medical malpractice case due to the existing SoL.157  The 
case attracted much attention, particularly in the Daily News, and 
 
151 Id. at 864. 
152 Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018, 2019 WL 5608534, at *11 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019). 
153 See Aicher, 613 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Tomczak v. Bailey, 578 N.W.2d 166, 170–71 (Wis. 
1998)). 
154 Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 66 N.E.3d 433, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citing Doe v. Diocese of 
Dall., 917 N.E.2d 475, 484 (Ill. 2009)). 
155 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4C (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (2019); 1 DOBBS ET 
AL., supra note 19, § 243, at 877–78. 
156 See Editorial, Reset the Clock for Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/opinion/new-york-laverns-law-malpractice.html [https://perma
.cc/E686-ED36]. 
157 See id. 
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resulted in reform legislation that passed both houses of the New 
York legislature and was signed into law by the Governor on January 
31, 2018.158  The changes to the SoL in the new bill only apply to 
cancer patients,159 but this bill sets a precedent that similar changes 
could be made for genetic malpractice cases. 
B. Solutions for Unjust Timing Limitations in Genetic Malpractice 
Cases 
From the examples discussed above involving non-genomic 
contexts, there are several possible approaches to avoid the unjust 
application of statutes of limitation, statutes of repose, or statutory 
notification requirements in genetic malpractice cases.  Courts can 
use their discretion and creativity by applying doctrines such as 
equitable tolling to avoid unfair and unjust application of statutory 
time limitations in genetic malpractice cases.  In at least two cases, 
the court used such discretion in a genetic malpractice case.  The first 
case involved a physician who failed to report a positive PKU test of 
a newborn girl, who was then disabled throughout her life but was 
never diagnosed with PKU.160  Decades later, she gave birth to a son 
who had microcephaly, and it was then discovered that high levels of 
phenylalanine in the mother’s blood due to her PKU caused the son’s 
severe impairment.161  Although decades had passed since the 
negligent act had occurred, the Indiana Appellate Court held that the 
statute of limitations did not start to run until the mother discovered 
her PKU status, and hence, the physician’s negligence, several 
decades later.162  The court of appeals noted, 
We are, of course, fully cognizant that we are permitting a 
nearly four-decade old claim of malpractice to proceed at this 
time.  Nonetheless, it is not unheard of in our jurisprudence 
to permit lawsuits based upon decades-old acts of negligence 
 
158 See Heidi Evans, Hospital’s Mistake Leaves Single Brooklyn Mom with 6 Months to Live, 
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 6, 2013, 2:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/hospital-
mistake-leaves-single-mom-6-months-live-article-1.1233989 [https://perma.cc/F4WT-578C]; 
Michael T. Hensley & Lauren Fenton-Valdivia, New York’s Lavern’s Law Expands the 
Discovery Rule Such that the Statute of Limitations Runs from the Cancer Diagnosis, BRESSLER, 
AMERY & ROSS, P.C. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.bressler.com/new-yorks-laverns-law-expands-
the-discovery-rule-such-that-the-statute-of-limitations-runs-from-the-cancer-diagnosis 
[https://perma.cc/S235-VY7X]; Editorial, Reset the Clock for Malpractice Suits, supra note 156. 
159 Hensley & Fenton-Valdivia, supra note 158. 
160 Houser v. Kaufman, 972 N.E.2d 927, 930–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 
161 Id. at 931–32. 
162 Id. at 937–38. 
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to proceed, under very limited circumstances. . . .  Stacy has 
been forced to suffer needlessly from a debilitating, but 
treatable, illness for almost forty years.  Given the highly 
unique facts here, and given the designated evidence of 
diligence by Stacy and her parents with respect to her PKU 
diagnosis (or lack thereof for the first thirty-three years of her 
life), we conclude that allowing this case to proceed does not 
contravene public policy and is consistent with the Act’s goals 
of maintaining sufficient medical treatment and controlling 
malpractice insurance costs by, in part, encouraging the 
prompt presentation of claims.163 
A second example is a New York case in which a couple used in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) with an egg donor to give birth to twin sons.164  
The IVF clinic purported to have genetically screened the egg donor, 
but one of the conceived children was determined to have fragile X 
syndrome many months after the child was born.165  The New York 
statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action required a 
lawsuit to be filed within 2.5 years of “the act, omission or failure” 
that was the subject of the lawsuit.166  The defendant argued, and the 
plain reading of the statute would suggest, that the act of failing to 
adequately test the egg donor occurred before the IVF procedure, in 
which case the statute of limitations would have expired by the time 
the lawsuit was filed.167  The New York court, however, used 
creativity and held that the statute started to run when the child was 
born, explaining that in a “claim for wrongful birth, ‘the parents’ 
legally cognizable injury is the increased financial obligation’ of 
raising an impaired child” and “[w]hether this legally cognizable 
injury will befall potential parents as the result of the gestation of an 
impaired fetus cannot be known until the pregnancy ends.  Only if 
there is a live birth will the injury be suffered.”168  The case was 
therefore ruled to be timely and allowed to proceed, a decision that 
was upheld on appeal.169 
 
163 Id. at 938 (citing Van Dusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491, 496 (Ind. 1999)). 
164 B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of N.Y., 22 N.Y.S.3d 190, 192 (App. Div. 2015), aff’d, 92 
N.E.3d 766 (N.Y. 2017). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 193 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a (McKinney 2019)). 
167 See B.F., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 193–94. 
168 Id. at 194–95 (quoting Foote v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 944 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (N.Y. 
2011)). 
169 B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of N.Y., 92 N.E.3d 766, 773 (N.Y. 2017). 
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Judges and attorneys in other genetic malpractice cases in which 
the statute of limitations would unfairly bar a plaintiff from bringing 
a genetic malpractice lawsuit could similarly invoke their equitable 
powers and creativity to extend the time for bringing the case.  
Unfortunately, such a strategy will likely not work for statutes of 
repose.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “Statutes of 
repose, on the other hand, generally may not be tolled, even in cases 
of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff’s control.”170 
However, a recent genetic malpractice case in North Carolina 
demonstrated another creative way that a court was able to 
circumvent the unjust results of a statute of repose.171  In that case, 
a pregnant wife engaged the defendant for prenatal care, which 
included genetic testing for cystic fibrosis carrier status.172  Although 
the genetic test results found the woman was a cystic fibrosis carrier, 
which normally would have led to testing of the husband and then 
fetus, the physician erroneously wrote in the medical record and 
communicated to the couple that the wife had tested negative for 
cystic fibrosis carrier status.173  The couple had a healthy child, but 
several years later she got pregnant again.174  Because the wife’s 
medical records showed that she did not carry a cystic fibrosis 
mutation, she was not genetically tested again.175  Unfortunately, she 
gave birth to a child who was subsequently diagnosed with cystic 
fibrosis, over five years after the original mistake was made in 
misdiagnosing the wife.176  The parents soon thereafter filed a 
medical malpractice lawsuit, but the defendants argued, and the trial 
court held, that the suit must be dismissed because it was barred by 
the state’s four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice.177  The 
Court of Appeals overturned this decision, however, by determining 
that same health care facility provided care for the couple during both 
pregnancies, and thus under the “continuing course of treatment” 
doctrine had continued to provide care and perpetuate the original 
error through the second pregnancy.178  The four-year statute of 
repose therefore did not start to run until the final pre-conception 
 
170 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014). 
171 See Glover v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. COA 17-1398, 2018 WL 4440582, 
at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018). 
172 Id. at *1. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at *1–2. 
175 Id. at *2. 
176 See id. 
177 Id. at *3. 
178 Id. at *7. 
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appointment in the second pregnancy so that the lawsuit was 
timely.179  In reaching this decision, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals was clearly troubled by the equities of the situation: 
Plaintiffs did not know, nor should they have known, of the 
malpractice that had occurred—that of incorrect information 
regarding Ms. Glover being a cystic fibrosis carrier—until the 
birth of their son, J.G.  It would be senseless to expect 
Plaintiffs would presciently know of the misinformation, 
before a problem arose, and would leave no recourse for 
Plaintiffs.  As they moved forward with family planning 
decisions, such unknown abnormalities could have arisen 
many years later.  No matter the number of years, the 
information would have been new to Plaintiffs.  For the above 
reasons, we find the “continuing course of treatment” doctrine 
squarely applies.180 
In cases where judicial discretion under the equitable tolling or 
other doctrines are unavailable to prevent unjust application of 
timing limitations, state constitutional arguments may provide an 
alternative argument for not applying the statute of limitations, 
statute of repose, or statutory notice requirement where it will 
unfairly deprive a plaintiff from bringing a case to vindicate their 
rights.181  As described previously, some but not all state courts have 
held statutes of limitation or repose unconstitutional as applied to 
limit a plaintiff’s right to bring a timely claim because the statute 
had run before the plaintiff knew the cause of the injury.182  This type 
of constitutional claim may be most often invoked against statutes of 
repose because they are not subject to the equitable tolling or 
adjustment that the courts have often applied to statutes of 
limitation. 
In at least one case, a court has upheld a constitutional challenge 
to a statute of limitations that had run before the plaintiffs would 
have had time to realize they had a viable genetic malpractice 
claim.183  In that case, a couple who had already had one child with 
Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy got pregnant again and sought 
 
179 Id. at *8. 
180 Id. at *7. 
181 See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 296 (N.H. 1983). 
182 See, e.g., id.; Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984); Susan C. Randall, 
Comment, Due Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose, 40 SW. L.J. 997, 1001 n.18 (1986). 
183 Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 923. 
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genetic testing to determine whether the mother was a carrier.184  
The genetics expert they consulted conducted genetic testing of the 
mother and reported that she did not carry the condition.185  Three 
years after the second child was born, he was diagnosed with 
Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy.186  The parents filed a medical 
malpractice lawsuit, but it was dismissed on the grounds that the 
two-year statute of limitations had started to run at the time of the 
negligent genetic advice and had, therefore, expired.187  The Texas 
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that applying the two-
year statute of limitations to prevent the parents from bringing a suit 
after they first learned of the mistake after the correct genetic 
diagnosis of their child violated the open courts provision of the state 
constitution “by cutting off a cause of action before the party knows, 
or reasonably should know, that he is injured.”188  The state supreme 
court described such an unfair outcome as “shocking” and “absurd.”189 
If neither an equitable or constitutional court challenge to an 
unjust SoL or SoR is available, the final option is legislative relief.190  
It may be difficult to persuade state legislators to take up this issue 
when only a handful cases have presented problems to date.  
However, if genomic malpractice cases become more prevalent, and 
more plaintiffs are unfairly denied an opportunity to pursue their 
claims on the merits due to the unique timing issues in many genetic 
malpractice cases, it is possible that a legislative remedy could 
eventually be feasible.191  A high-profile case that stirs public outrage 
at the unfairness and injustice of the outcome, as has recently 
occurred in New York with Lavern’s Law,192 would likely be 
necessary to get sufficient political traction and support.  At a 
minimum, given that statutes of repose only exist in some but not all 
states in the medical context, legislatures should be wary of adopting 
new statutes of repose that would apply to genomic malpractice 
cases. 
 
184 Id. at 919–20. 
185 Id. at 920. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 919. 
188 Id. at 919, 922–23. 
189 Id. at 923 (quoting Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 
S.W.2d 577, 681 (Tex. 1967)). 
190 See, e.g., Editorial, Reset the Clock for Malpractice Suits, supra note 156. 
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192 See supra notes 156–158 and accompanying text. 
0061 MARCHANT ET AL, UNJUST GENETIC MALPRACTICE TIMING LIMITATIONS 1/17/2020  2:55 PM 
2019/2020] Unjust Genetic Malpractice Timing Limitations 87 
CONCLUSION 
Genetic malpractice cases present unique timing issues because 
they often involve negligent acts that do not result in manifested 
clinical outcomes until several years or even a generation or two 
later.  As a result, the fair resolution of such cases will often be in 
tension with statutory timing limits such as statutes of limitations 
and statutes of repose.  There have already been several cases where 
plaintiffs allegedly harmed by a provider’s negligent act relating to 
genetic information were denied an opportunity to prosecute their 
case because they did not discover the tort until after the timing limit 
had expired.  Judges and attorneys should be aware that there may 
be judicial tools available to counter unfair and unjust applications 
of statutory timing limits.  In particular, the courts can use equitable 
tolling or other equitable patterns to ensure fair application of the 
statute of limitations by providing the plaintiff a reasonable 
opportunity and time to file a lawsuit after the time in which they did 
or reasonably should have discovered the existence of their legal 
claim.  Statutes of repose present a greater challenge, since they are 
generally not subject to equitable modifications, and therefore a 
constitutional challenge is the most promising approach.  If a judicial 
solution is not available, then legislative modifications of the 
statutory timing limitation may be the only recourse for plaintiffs 
denied a fair opportunity to litigate their genetic malpractice claim. 
